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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
PAUL EDWIN WOOLLEY, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No, 
Priority No. 13 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Court of Appeals appropriately applied case law from 
this Court in reaching its decision. The trial judge abused his 
discretion in refusing to remove Juror VanLeeuwen for cause where 
(1) the trial judge originally granted Mr. Woolley's challenge of 
VanLeeuwen, then reinstated him; (2) the judge removed for cause two 
other jurors who had been victims of similar crimes; and (3) the 
judge failed to adequately question the jurors about the prior 
victimization. 
The consistent and repeated holding of this Court that a 
new trial is required when a criminal defendant is forced to use a 
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who the trial judge should 
have removed for cause is based on state statutory and 
constitutional law. The decision in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 
(1988), does not affect that holding since that decision focused on 
Oklahoma law which requires a defendant to use a peremptory 
challenge to remove a juror who is erroneously not removed for 
cause. The Ross court's decision that such a law does not violate 
the sixth and fourteenth amendments does not impact on Utah law. 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was issued on 
April 10, 1991 and can be found at State v. Woolley. 158 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). A copy of the opinion is contained in 
Addendum A. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant statutes and constitutional provisions are 
contained in Addendum D to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/Respondent, Paul Edwin Woolley, was convicted 
by a jury of two counts of Forgery, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1989). R. 44, 72-3. 
The trial judge sentenced him to serve two concurrent terms of zero 
to five years at the Utah State Prison. 
Mr. Woolley appealed his convictions to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. That court reversed his convictions in a decision issued 
April 10, 1991. 
The State did not file a petition for rehearing in the 
Court of Appeals in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI 
SINCE THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY FOLLOWED 
AND ANALYZED DECISIONS OF THIS COURT, 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is consistent with 
decisions of this Court. See State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 883 
(Utah 1981); State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 766-8 (Utah 1980); 
State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989). Requiring the trial 
court to investigate further or remove a challenged juror for cause 
where the juror has indicated that he or she has been the victim of 
a similar crime presents a logical, straightforward rule for trial 
courts. This Court has recognized that "it is a simple matter to 
obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror 
and selecting another." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 
1981). It is also a simple matter, which could have an overwhelming 
impact on the impartiality of the jury and the fairness of the 
trial, to investigate further where a question of bias is raised. 
See generally State v. Bailey. 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980); 
State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989). 
Although the State apparently claims that being the 
victim of a similar crime does not raise an inference of bias, 
common sense dictates that a question as to the juror7s impartiality 
is raised where the juror was a victim of a similar crime. See 
generally People v. Diaz. 200 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79-85 (Cal. App. 4 
Dist. 1984) (discussing strong potential for bias where juror had 
previously been victim of a crime similar to that with which 
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defendant was charged); State v. Brooks, 631 P. 2d at 883-84 (jurors 
who were victims of similar crime which affected their impartiality 
should have been excused for cause). Notions of fairness require 
that a trial judge probe further or dismiss the juror. 
In its argument for certiorari, the State fails to 
mention significant factual bases which the majority of the Court of 
Appeals relied on in reaching its decision. 
During voir dire, three potential jurors indicated that 
they had been victims of crimes which were similar to that with 
which Mr. Woolley was charged. Tl:32, 33, 74-6. See Addendum B for 
transcript relevant to this issue. Rather than asking the three 
jurors what their reactions were to the crimes, the trial judge 
asked the jurors as a group to raise their hands if they thought the 
experience would preclude them from being fair. None of the jurors 
raised his hand. Tl:33. 
At the conclusion of voir dire, during a bench 
conference, defense counsel challenged all three jurors for cause. 
Tl:35, 74-5. The trial judge initially struck all three jurors for 
cause, then reinstated Juror VanLeeuwen. R. 46; Tl 74-5.1 
1. Although the majority recognized that the trial judge had 
initially struck Juror VanLeeuwen for cause and later reinstated him 
(Woolley, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39-40), the dissent claimed in 
footnote 8 that the record does not reflect such an unusual 
occurrence. Id. at 46. However, the jury list contained in the 
district court file, which is part of the official record in this 
case, establishes that the trial judge removed Jurors Tyler, Hoyt 
and VanLeeuwen (VanLeeuwen is "#2" for cause, Tyler is "#1" and Hoyt 
is "#3") and later crossed out the notation following VanLeeuwen's 
name. R. 4 6 (see Addendum C for copy of jury list). Defense 
counsel made a record of this unusual occurrence of reinstating a 
(footnote continued) 
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In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals focused on 
the fact that the trial judge had initially removed the juror for 
cause. (Woolley, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36, 39). The majority 
stated: 
Once a trial judge has found that a juror 
should be removed for cause, it is highly 
unusual for this juror to be reinstated without 
further voir dire to develop new facts to 
support the change in direction. 
Id. at 39-40. 
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the trial 
judge had removed for cause two other jurors who had been victims of 
crimes similar to that which was charged in the instant case. The 
only distinction between those two jurors and VanLeeuwen which is 
evident in the record is the factual discrepancies involved in the 
prior crimes. The Court of Appeals noted that the facts of the 
prior crimes indicated that VanLeeuwen was the most likely of the 
three to be biased as the result of the prior victimization. 
(footnote 1 continued) 
juror who was at first removed for cause, and neither the State nor 
the trial judge took issue with defense counsel's representation 
that the judge had initially struck VanLeeuwen for cause. 
Tl:74-77. During oral argument in the Court of Appeals, counsel for 
the State conceded that this unusual occurrence had transpired and 
acknowledged that had the trial judge granted all three challenges, 
there would not have been enough jurors to proceed unless the State 
had agreed to waive one of its peremptory challenges. (See 
Rule 18(c)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (allowing each party 
four peremptory challenges)). Unfortunately, the microphone at the 
podium was apparently not turned on during oral argument, and these 
statements by the State's attorney were not recorded. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that in its petition for writ of certiorari, 
the State does not take the position that this highly unusual 
circumstance did not occur. 
- 5 -
In actuality, based on the meager information 
gathered by the trial court, VanLeeuwen was 
objectively the most likely of the three 
previously victimized jurors to be biased. 
• • • 
[W]e find no persuasive distinction between 
VanLeeuwen and the other two prospective jurors 
who had also been victims of similar crimes and 
who the trial judge presumably found could not 
be fair and impartial as he removed them for 
cause. 
Id. at 40.2 
This Court has recognized that where the trial court 
removed other jurors who gave answers which were similar to those of 
the disputed juror, the trial judge must either remove the 
challenged juror for cause or investigate further. See State v. 
Bailev, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980); State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 
475 (Utah 1987). In State v. Jones, 734 P.2d at 475 n.l, this Court 
stated: 
We note that the trial court excused two other 
prospective jurors for cause because of their 
statements that they would expect the defendant 
to prove his innocence. Neither of these other 
jurors indicated that he had any direct ties to 
the murder victim or the victim's family, only 
that the juror held a generalized belief that a 
defendant should have to prove his innocence. 
This makes the trial court's failure to dismiss 
Ms. Opheikens for cause even more anomalous in 
light of her similar statement and her direct 
ties to the victim's family. 
See also State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768 (where trial court failed 
to remove juror for cause who had agreed with comments of another 
juror who court did remove for cause, the trial court "had the duty 
2. The Court of Appeals also expressed concern about the limited 
voir dire conducted in this case, and the failure of the trial judge 
to individually question the jurors, Id. at 39, 40. 
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to remove [the juror] for bias or investigate further until the 
inference of bias was rebutted . • . " ) . 
In Bailey, this Court pointed out that where juror 
response "facially raised a question of bias," the trial court was 
required to remove the juror for cause or investigate further. Id.; 
see also State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989).3 The 
inference or question of bias raised in the present case required 
that the trial judge investigate further or remove VanLeeuwen for 
cause. Forcing Mr. Woolley to use a peremptory challenge to remove 
VanLeeuwen requires a new trial. 
The State argues only that an inference of bias was not 
raised; it does not argue that if such an inference were raised, it 
was rebutted. This Court has consistently held that where an 
inference of bias is raised, it cannot be rebutted simply by the 
3. In his dissent, Judge Bench makes a distinction between a 
"question" of bias and an "inference" of bias raised by juror 
responses. Judge Bench appears to acknowledge that in this case a 
"question about potential bias [was raised] which requires general 
probing into the prospective juror's state of mind in light of that 
experience." Id. at 42. 
This Court has never drawn a distinction between a 
"question" of bias and an "inference" of bias, and has used the two 
terms interchangeably. See State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768; 
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1126. As the majority pointed out: 
We find no distinction in Utah case law between 
a "question of bias" and an "inference of 
bias." Furthermore, we find no good policy 
reason not to require probing to clarify any 
possible prejudice when fundamental rights are 
at stake. Such narrow line drawing would only 
cause confusion for trial judges . . . A 
broader and simpler statement of the rule 
actually gives trial judges clearer direction 
and more latitude in ferreting out potential 
bias. 
Id. at 37. 
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juror's statement that he or she can be fair. As the Court stated 
in State v. Jones. 734 P.2d at 475, citing Brooks II. 631 P.2d at 
884: "When a prospective juror expresses an attitude of bias, a 
later assertion by the juror that he or she can render an impartial 
verdict cannot attenuate the earlier expressions of bias." 
Furthermore, "[a] statement made by a prospective juror that he 
intends to be fair and impartial loses its meaning in light of other 
testimony or facts that suggest bias." State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d 
22, 26 (Utah 1984). See also State v. Pike. 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 
1985) (juror may not be able to recognize influence of improper 
contacts); People v. Diazf 200 Cal. Rptr. 77, 80 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 
1984) (recognition that statement regarding ability to deliberate 
impartially is self-serving). 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals analyzed and 
followed case law from this Court. There is no basis for this Court 
to grant certiorari on this issue. 
POINT II. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI 
BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE AN 
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN 
DECIDED BY THIS COURT, AND THE REVERSIBLE 
NATURE OF THIS ISSUE IS GROUNDED ON STATE 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
In a footnote to its argument in its opening brief, the 
State, without analysis, requested that the Court of Appeals 
"reevaluate its previous decisions in light of Ross [v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 81 (1988)]" should that court "determine that 
Mr. VanLeeuwen should have been excused for cause[.]" State's brief 
- 8 -
at 10, footnote 1. Both the majority and dissenting Court of 
Appeals opinions in this case similarly relegated their discussions 
of Ross to footnote status. See State v. Woollev, 158 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 41, n.5, 47, n.12. The State now asserts that through these 
various footnotes, "the court of appeals decided an important 
question of law which has not been, but should be, settled by this 
Court." State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8.4 Contrary to 
the State's claims, a reassessment of this Court's repeated holding 
that prejudicial error occurs where a party is required to use a 
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed 
for cause should not be reviewed by this Court in this case. 
Furthermore, the holding in Ross does not require any 
change in existing Utah law. In Ross, the United States Supreme 
Court determined that Oklahoma law which limited the exercise of 
peremptory challenges by requiring that the defendant use his 
peremptories to cure erroneous denials of challenges for cause did 
not violate the sixth and fourteenth amendments unless a juror who 
4. It should be noted that the State did not file a petition for 
rehearing in this case. Hence, it did not brief its argument under 
Ross v. Oklahoma prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals, nor 
did it take advantage of the opportunity to brief the argument by 
asking the court to reconsider the discussion contained in 
footnote 5 to the majority opinion. Although Ross was discussed 
during oral argument in the Court of Appeals, the microphone at the 
podium apparently was not on during argument, and it is impossible 
to hear the attorneys' voices. Appellate counsel cannot recall the 
extent to which the issue was argued; however, following oral 
argument, defense counsel filed a letter of supplemental authorities 
citing State v. Sexton, 787 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Ariz. App. 1990), in 
support of her position during oral argument that Ross does not 
affect the repeated holdings of this Court. 
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should have been removed for cause actually sits on the jury.5 
By contrast, Utah law does not require the use of 
peremptory challenges to cure erroneous denials of challenges for 
cause; instead, Utah law requires a new trial where a defendant is 
required to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should 
have been removed for cause. See State v. Gotschall. 782 P.2d 459 
(Utah 1989); State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1989). 
In Julian, a post-Ross case, this Court stated: 
This Court has repeatcsdly held that it is 
prejudicial error to compel a party to exercise 
a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective 
juror who should properly have been removed for 
cause. [footnote omitted] 
This repeated holding is grounded on Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which this Court quoted immediately following 
the above statement in Julian. 
Virtually all of the cases cited in footnote 11 in 
support of this proposition in Julian refer to Rule 18, Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure and/or Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution as the basis for this holding. See, e.g., State v. 
Jones. 734 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987) (citing Article I, section 12 
of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e)(14) 
5. In footnote 4, the Court stated: 
We need not decide the broader question 
whether, in the absence of Oklahoma's 
limitation on the "right" to exercise 
peremptory challenges, "a denial or impairment" 
of the exercise of peremptory challenges occurs 
if the defendant uses one or more challenges to 
remove jurors who should have been removed for 
cause. [citations omitted] 
Ross v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. at 91. 
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[without referring to the sixth or fourteenth amendments] in support 
of holding that prejudicial error occurs when trial court refuses to 
dismiss juror for cause, thereby requiring defendant to use 
peremptory challenge); State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d at 25; State v. 
Bailey, 605 P.2d at 767-88. Utah law, not the sixth and fourteenth 
amendments, is the consistent basis for this repeated holding. 
Because this Court's repeated and consistent holding that 
requiring a defendant to use a peremptory challenge to remove a 
juror who should have been removed for cause is based on state law 
and not the sixth and fourteenth amendments, Ross v. Oklahoma has no 
impact on that holding. The majority of the Court of Appeals panel 
which heard this case recognized that this holding is based on Utah 
law and unaffected by the Ross decision in footnote 5 to its 
decision. That footnote states in part: 
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with this 
precise issue in 1989 in Gotschall and Julian 
after Ross was decided. We assume that the 
court considered Ross when deciding Gotschall 
and Julian, but chose to stay with its 
long-standing rule that "[a] court commits 
prejudicial error if it forces a party to 
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a 
prospective juror who should have been removed 
for cause." Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; see 
also Julian, 771 P.2d at 1046 n.ll. 
Accordingly, we assume this is still the law in 
Utah. 
Woolley, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 (emphasis added). 
In State v. Sexton, 787 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. App. 1990), the 
court rejected the State#s argument that Ross v. Oklahoma required 
that a case not be reversed unless a juror who should have been 
excused for cause actually sat on the jury. The Sexton court 
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focused on the Ross court's reliance on Oklahoma's law which 
requires that a defendant use his peremptory challenges to remove 
jurors who should have been removed for cause, and pointed out: 
Our case differs from Ross, Unlike Oklahoma, 
Arizona law does not require a defendant to use 
peremptory challenges to cure a trial court's 
erroneous refusal to strike a juror for cause. 
The rule in Arizona is that the right to 
peremptory challenges is so substantial that 
forcing a party to use a peremptory challenge 
to strike potential jurors who should have been 
stricken for cause denies the litigant a 
substantial right. [citations omitted]. 
Sexton, 787 P.2d at 1099. 
The reversible nature of the type of error which occurred 
in this case is well established in Utah law. The Court of Appeals 
did not decide an important issue which should have been decided by 
this Court, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is consistent 
with Ross. 
Mr. Woolley respectfully requests that this Court deny 
certiorari on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Woolley respectfully requests that this Court deny 
the State's petition for writ of certiorari. 
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SUBMITTED this / ~7~ day of July, 1991. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Respondent 
f
 ^ L 
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR. 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this Yl day of July, 1991. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by this day 
of July, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM A 
CODE•co State v. 
Provo, Utah 158 Utah / 
let alone analyze, why the dismissal of her 
fraud claim was error. Generally, where an 
appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the 
point is waived. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of 
Calif, v. State, 677 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Alaska 
1984) (points initially raised on appeal but not 
briefed are considered abandoned); Quality 
Furniture, Inc. v. Hay, 61 Haw. 89, 595 P.2d 
1066, 1068 (1979) (issues raised but not argued 
in brief are waived); Northwest National Gas 
Co. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 53 Or. App. 
89, 630 P.2d 1326, 1329 (assigned errors not 
briefed are waived), review denied, 291 Or. 
893, 642 P.2d 309 (1981); Kurpjuweit v. 
Northwestern Dev. Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 46 
(Wyo. 1985) (errors not asserted are waived or 
abandoned). Because Pixton has not articul-
ated how the district court erred, and we find 
no support for her fraud claim in the record, 
we affirm the trial court's ruling on appeal. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. Contrasting first-party situations with third-
party situations, we note that in a first-party situ-
ation the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted by 
the insured for losses suffered by the insured. In a 
third-party situation, however, the insurer agrees 
to defend the insured against claims made by third-
parties against the insured and to pay resulting lia-
bility up to a specified amount. See Beck v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 n.2 (Utah 1985). 
2. We note that Pixton relies on Rawlings v. 
Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 726 P.2d 565 (1986) as 
authority directly supporting the imposition of a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing where an insurer 
is both the first-party insurer and the tortfeasor's 
insurer and where the insurer has unreasonably 
impeded recovery on the liability policy. We agree 
that Rawlings did impose a duty in this context. 
However, the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
outlined by the Arizona court is one sounding in 
tort. Utah has carefully adopted a more restrictive 
contract approach. Furthermore, the actions of the 
insurer in Rawlings amounted to an independent 
tort. Cf. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 705, 
800 n.3 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that some acts that 
breach a contract give rise to tort causes of action 
independent of an implied covenant of good faith). 
In the Arizona case, the Rawlings had a $10,000 fire 
policy with Farmers. The Rawlings suffered a 
$40,000 fire loss. The Rawlings belie\ed the fire was 
negligently caused by a third-party and informed 
Farmers of this fact. Farmers agreed to investigate 
Rawlings' suspicion and to give Rawlings a copy of 
the written report resulting from the investigation. 
Upon investigation, the Farmers adjustor learned 
that Farmers also had a $100,000 liability policy 
covering the tortfeasor. Farmers never informed 
Rawlings of this insurance policy. Thereafter, 
Farmers refused to give Rawlings the report and 
intentionally withheld critical information necessary 
for Rawlings to pursue its claim against the tortfe-
asor. The Arizona court characterized the conduct 
as follows: "The evidentiary facts indicate that 
Farmers pursued its objective (of preventing Rawl-
v. Rep. 35 35 
ings suit against the tortfeasor] by deceit, non disc-
losure, reneging on promises, violation of industry 
custom and deliberate attempts to obfuscate." Id. at 
577. 
Finally, we are not persuaded that the analysis of 
the Arizona court is consistent with Beck. Cf. Hettwer 
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 118 Idaho 
373, 797 P.2d 81 (1990) (refusing to adopt Rawlings 
approach when reviewing dismissal of third-party 
bad faith claims of party insured by same insurance 
company as tortfeasor because Rawlings involved 
imposition of a tort-based duty in a first-party 
situation). 
Cite as 
158 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 
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Defendant Paul Edwin Woolley appeals 
from his conviction of two counts of forgery, 
a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1989). Defendant 
claims the trial court committed reversible 
error by failing either to remove a juror for 
cause or to ask questions to probe his poten-
tial bias when the juror admitted he had been 
a victim of forgery. We reverse and remand 
for a new trial. 
FACTS 
During voir dire of potential jurors in def-
endant's trial, the court, at the request of 
defendant's counsel, asked: "Are there those 
among you ... , members of the panel, who 
have yourselves been the victim of a forgery or 
a crime involving deception or fraud?" Three 
potential jurors, Mark Hoyt, Chris VanLee-
uwen, and James Tyler, responded affirmati-
vely. Hoyt explained that his wallet was taken 
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when he was in California and that his credit 
card was used. VanLeeuwen related that when 
he was in Brazil, a thief stole his wallet and 
wrote about $5,000 worth of checks on his 
account. Similarly, Tyler explained that some 
of his checks were stolen in 1961 when he 
lived in Los Angeles and that someone had 
forged his signature on some of those checks. 
Following these responses, the trial court 
asked Hoyt, VanLeeuwen, and Tyler, as a 
group, one general follow-up question: 
Those three of you who have resp-
onded, recognizing that this is a 
different time and place and circu-
mstance, would that experience, 
having been the victim of that type 
of a crime, affect your ability to be 
fair and impartial in this case, that 
is, would you be unable to set aside 
that experience and hear the evid-
ence in this case and rule on the 
evidence based upon what you hear 
and the credibility of the witnesses? 
If you would not be able to do so, I 
want you to raise your hand. 
None of those questioned raised his hand. 
At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial 
court requested counsel to pass the jury for 
cause. The defense refused and requested a 
sidebar conference. During the conference, 
defense counsel asked the court to remove 
Hoyt, Tyler, and VanLeeuwen because of their 
admissions to having been victims of similar 
crimes. The trial judge initially struck all three 
of the challenged jurors for cause.1 Subsequ-
ently, however, the court reinstated juror 
VanLeeuwen, explaining its action by stating 
that VanLeeuwen need not be removed 
because the forgery occurred in a foreign 
country. Defense counsel objected to the rei-
nstatement of VanLeeuwen and subsequently 
removed VanLeeuwen by peremptory chall-
enge. 
Defendant was convicted on both counts of 
forgery and was sentenced tc two concurrent 
terms of zero to five years. Defendant argues 
on appeal that the court committed reversible 
error in reinstating VanLeeuwen. 
REMOVAL OF A JUROR FOR CAUSE 
A motion to dismiss a prospective juror for 
cause is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. When reviewing such a ruling, we 
reverse only if the trial court has abused its 
discretion. State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 
462 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Larson, 775 
P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)).2 The Utah 
Supreme Court has noted, however, that the 
exercise of the trial court's discretion in sele-
cting a fair and impartial jury must be viewed 
"in light of the fact that it is a simple matter 
to obviate any problem of bias simply by 
excusing the prospective juror and selecting 
another." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533. 
536 (Utah 1981).* 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistent!} 
emphasized that "it is [the trial judge's] dut> 
to see that the constitutional right of an 
accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded," 
Stare v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318, 319-20 (Utah 
1977), and has reversed criminal convictions 
based solely on the appearance that such right 
may have been jeopardized.4 Accordingly, trial 
courts must adequately probe a juror's pote-
ntial bias when that juror's responses or other 
facts suggest a bias. The court's discretion is 
properly exercised when deciding whether to 
dismiss a juror for cause only after this inve-
stigation takes place. 
A party is entitled to use peremptory chall-
enges to remove jurors who are not properly 
removed for cause. Stare v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 
878, 883 (Utah 1981) ("Brooks 11"); State v. 
Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Utah 1977) 
("Brooks I"); Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 
1091, 1093 (Utah 1975). It is prejudicial error 
to compel a party to exercise a peremptory 
challenge to remove a prospective juror who 
should have been removed for cause. Gotsc-
hall, 782 P.2d at 461; Stare v. Julian, 111 
P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1989).* 
A. Juror Impartiality 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitu-
tion and the sixth amendment to the United 
States Constitution guarantee a criminal def-
endant the right to a trial by an impartial jury. 
See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 
1988). Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e) 
implements these constitutional mandates and 
offers guidance as to when a juror should be 
removed for cause. This rule provides in rel-
evant part: 
The challenge for cause is an obje-
ction to a particular juror and may 
be taken on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
(14) That a state of mind exists on 
the part of the juror with reference 
to the cause, or to either party, 
which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the party 
challenging .... 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14). 
Juror impartiality is a "mental attitude of 
appropriate indifference." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 
451 (citing Brooks I, 563 P.2d at 801). "Chief 
Justice Marshall, presiding over the trial of 
Aaron Burr in 1807, defined an impartial jury 
as one composed of persons who 'will fairly 
hear the testimony which may be offered to 
them, and bring in their verdict, according to 
that testimony, and according to the law 
arising on it.'" Srare v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 
767 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted). 
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assessing whether a juror should be 
ved for cause, the supreme court has 
the following guidance: 
Light impressions which may fairly 
3e supposed to yield to the testi-
mony that may be offered; which 
[nay leave the mind open to a fair 
:onsideration of that testimony, 
constitute no sufficient objection to 
a juror; but ... those strong and 
deep impressions which will close 
the mind against the testimony that 
may be offered in opposition to 
them; which will combat that testi-
mony and resist its force, do cons-
titute a sufficient objection to him. 
m, 771 P.2d at 1064-65 (citations 
ted). 
nee a juror's impartiality has been put in 
3t, a trial judge must investigate by further 
tions to determine if the juror has merely 
it impressions" or impressions which are 
3ng and deep" and which will affect the 
r's impartiality. "When comments are 
e which facially question a prospective 
r's impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of 
retion may occur unless the challenged 
r is removed by the court or unless the 
*t or counsel investigates and finds the 
rence rebutted." State v. Cobb, 114 P.2d 
5, 1126 (Utah 1989); see also Bishop, 735 
i a t 451. 
he dissent concludes that the mere fact 
a juror was the victim of the same crime 
which the defendant is on trial does not 
e an "inference of bias" but merely a 
estion of bias." The dissent claims, there-
:, that under these circumstances, a trial 
ge is not required to probe the juror to 
ermine whether the potential bias is merely 
light impression," thus allowing the juror 
remain, or an "impression which is deep 
strong," in which case the court should 
iove the juror for cause. 
VQ find no distinction in Utah case law 
ween a "question of bias" and an 
ference of bias." Furthermore, we find no 
»d policy reason not to require probing to 
ify any possible prejudice when fundame-
I rights are at stake. Such narrow line 
wing would only cause confusion for trial 
ges. First, judges would be required to 
ermine if there was a potential for bias. 
<t, they would have to determine whether it 
into the class of a "question of bias" 
ere minimal investigation was required or 
"inference of bias" where more thorough 
^stioning was required. A broader and 
ipler statement of the rule actually gives 
il judges clearer direction and more latitude 
Arreting out potential bias. 
iVe agree with the dissent that a trial judge 
the first instance conducts voir dire to 
)be for potential bias. That is what the trial 
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judge did in the instant case when he asked 
the potential jurors if any of them had been a 
victim of forgery. This probe did reveal a 
"question" or an "inference" of bias on the 
part of three potential jurors. Thus, we 
believe, contrary to the dissent, that "because 
the probing revealed a potential for bias," the 
trial judge was required to address the poten-
tial bias "through rehabilitative inquiry" until 
this "inference" or "question" was rebutted. 
This is precisely what the trial judge attempted 
to do. 
Additionally, we do not understand what 
the dissent means by a "per se" inference of 
bias and reject any such nomenclature. If "per 
se" as used by the dissent means that a pote-
ntial juror's prior victimization of the same 
crime for which the defendant is on trial raises 
an inference such that the trial judge must 
probe the juror to insure that he or she can 
decide the case impartially despite the past 
victimization, we do so hold. This rule, 
however, is not appropriately categorized as a 
"per se" rule as there is no result which auto-
matically follows. If, however, "per se" as 
used by the dissent means that a potential 
juror's prior victimization creates an inference 
such that the juror's removal is mandated, we 
clearly reject such a position. We simply find, 
as did the trial judge, that the responses of the 
potential jurors that they had been victims of 
the same crime for which the defendant was 
being tried were "comments" which raised a 
facial question as to each prospective juror's 
impartiality, thus requiring further probing by 
the trial judge. 
The dissent relies heavily on the recent Utah 
Court of Appeals decision in State v. Jonas, 
793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) for the 
proposition that a prospective juror's prior 
victimization of the same crime with which the 
defendant is charged does not raise an infer-
ence of bias. We agree that there is some 
troublesome language in Jonas but find its 
result consistent with our conclusion in the 
instant case. In Jonas, a prospective juror 
disclosed during voir dire that she had been 
the victim of theft, the offense with which the 
defendant had been charged. The Jonas trial 
judge correctly asked the juror no less than 
ten individual follow-up questions probing 
her potential bias and her answers dispelled 
any inference of bias. Against this backdrop, 
the court of appeals found no reversible error 
when the trial court refused to remove her for 
cause. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals did 
state that the prospective juror's initial com-
ments did not raise an inference of bias such 
that the juror should have been excused for 
cause. The court based its conclusion, 
however, on the juror's responses to the trial 
court's many questions. We think the Jonas 
analysis confuses the two-part test of Cobb6 
and reject it to the extent it holds that being a 
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victim of the same crime with which the def-
endant is charged does not raise an inference 
or question of bias such that the court must-
just as the Jonas court did~investigate 
further to probe the juror's ability to be fair 
and impartial. 
B. Investigation Necessary to Probe Potential 
Bias 
The level of investigation necessary once 
voir dire reveals potential juror bias will vary 
from case to case and is necessarily dependent 
on the juror's responses to the questions 
asked. Nevertheless, the exploration should 
not be merely pro forma. 
When an inference of bias is raised, the 
inference is generally not rebutted simply by a 
subsequent general statement by the juror that 
he or she can be fair and impartial. As the 
supreme court has stated, "[a] statement made 
by a juror that she intends to be fair and 
impartial loses much of its meaning in light of 
other testimony and facts which suggest a 
bias." State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 
(quoting Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536). Accordi-
ngly, "[tjhe court, not the juror, must deter-
mine a juror's qualifications." Sfare v. Jones, 
734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987) (quoting Brooks 
7/,631P.2dat884). 
Utah case law is helpful in determining the 
depth of inquiry which has been sufficient to 
clarify potential juror bias. In Bailey, 605 
P.2d at 771, the defendant was charged with 
distribution of a controlled substance. At trial, 
the only witness to testify was the undercover 
police officer who made the arrest. During 
voir dire of the jury panel, prospective jurors 
were asked if they would be inclined to give 
the testimony of a police officer greater weight 
than that of a witness who was not a police 
officer. A prospective juror stated, "you can 
rely upon their testimony and their backgr-
ound to the utmost .... I would want to stand 
behind them a hundred percent." Id. at 768. 
In response to this facial comment of bias, the 
trial court responded by asking only one 
question as to the juror's expressed bias. 
Being satisfied that the juror could act impa-
rtially, the court did not remove the juror for 
cause. Id. Ultimately, the defendant was 
convicted and appealed. The supreme court 
reversed and remanded, noting that the trial 
court's minimal investigation and questioning 
was insufficient to rebut the inference of bias. 
The court stated that "[t]he [trial] Court's one 
question was not sufficient to rebut this infe-
rence," adding that "the Court had insufficient 
evidence on which to base a conclusion that 
there was no bias ...." Id. 
In Jonas, 793 P.2d at 902, the trial judge ask-
ed eleven different questions in establishing the 
impartiality of a prospective juror who had been 
the victim of a theft, the crime with which the 
defendant was charged. Similarly, in Salt Lake 
City v. Tuero, 745 P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). the trial court made "signifi-
cant efforts" to determine if a potential juror in 
a case involving driving under the influence of 
alcohol could remain unbiased given the fact 
that his wife had been "broadsided by a drunk 
driver." Id. at 1282. 
The depth of questioning necessary is 
further illustrated by a case very similar to the 
instant case; Brooks II, 631 P.2d at 878. Brooks 
II involved a defendant charged with 
burglary for unlawfully entering a basement 
apartment with the intent to commit theft. 
During voir dire of the jury venire, two pros-
pective jurors stated that they had been 
victims of the same or similar crimes. One 
juror responded that his home had been bur-
glarized twice. The other juror noted that she 
had been the victim of an armed robbery and 
assault in her home. Because of the possible 
biases created by this prior victimization, the 
court asked multiple questions of these two 
jurors. Both jurors indicated that they had 
strong feelings about their experiences but felt 
that they could render a fair and impartial 
verdict based on the evidence. Both jurors, 
therefore, were retained. 
On appeal, the supreme court held that the 
jurors had not been rehabilitated by the 
court's questioning and should have been 
excused for cause. See id.; see also Gotschall, 
782 P.2d at 459 (A prospective juror made 
statements that evidenced a lack of understa-
nding of the prosecution's burden of proof 
and the defendant's right not to take the 
stand. The trial judge asked the juror fourteen 
questions before determining that he need not 
be excused for cause. The supreme court aff-
irmed.); Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1123 (A prospec-
tive juror in a second-degree murder trial 
expressed strong feelings against the taking of 
human life. This juror was asked eleven que-
stions before the court determined that he 
could serve impartially. The supreme court 
aff irmed.);7 Julian, 111 P.2d at 1061 
(Prospective juror in a trial involving charges 
of sodomy on a child made comments which 
facially indicated she was predisposed to 
believe the victims' testimony and was thus 
incapable of rendering an impartial verdict. 
This juror was asked twenty separate questions 
before the trial court decided she could act 
impartially. On appeal, the supreme court held 
that the juror had been rehabilitated.); Tuero, 
745 P.2d at 1283 (The wife of a prospective 
juror in a case involving driving under the 
influence of alcohol had been "broadsided by 
a drunk driver." The court made "significant 
efforts" to determine that this juror could 
remain unbiased. The court of appeals affi-
rmed.); Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 
967 (Utah Ct. App.) (The defendant in a trial 
involving driving under the influence of 
alcohol believed that two prospective jurors 
were partial. One juror was associated with 
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers; the other 
juror was a reserve police officer in an adjoi-
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y. Before these jurors were impaneled, 
ve "substantial assurances," by way of 
es to "specific, detailed questioning" by 
irt, that they could be fair and impar-
he court of appeals affirmed.), cert. 
765P.2d 1277(1987). 
dissent contends that the instant case is 
3us to Hornsby v. Corporation of the 
ng Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
of Latter-Day Saints, 758 P.2d 929 
Ct. App. 1988), claiming this court in 
ase held that one general question to 
ctive jurors was sufficient to detect any 
hich would warrant removal for cause. 
. at 932. We disagree. Hornsby did not 
on the issue of removal of a juror for 
iornsby, the plaintiff was seeking reco-
Yom the Church of Jesus Christ of 
-Day Saints ("L.D.S. Church") for 
s sustained by the plaintiff when he 
\& his motorcycle to avoid colliding with 
xh-owned cow on a public highway. At 
ime of voir dire, plaintiff proposed 
1 questions to the trial court regarding 
"filiation of the prospective jurors with 
.D.S. Church. The trial court rejected 
questions, stating that the religious pre-
es of the jurors were none of the court's 
;ss. Instead, the court asked one general 
on: 
ire there any of you who feel that 
ou would have trouble being an 
npartial juror because of feelings 
ou may have either pro or con 
/ith regard to the L.D.S. Church 
hat you think might affect your 
ibility to be a fair and impartial 
uror in this case? If so, I'd like 
'ou to raise your hand. 
931-32. 
rnsby objected to the trial court's action 
subsequently filed an appeal, claiming 
the trial court erred in limiting voir dire 
ding the panel's religious affiliations, 
rdingly, the issue on appeal, as clearly 
i by this court, was whether the trial 
erred in refusing to voir dire members of 
Liry panel concerning their affiliation with 
L.D.S. Church such that the defendant 
1 knowingly exercise his peremptory cha-
es. We found the court had erred by 
ing voir dire. 
le dissent refers to a small portion of dicta 
iornsby which can be misleading when 
i out of context: "[tjhe question asked by 
trial court was sufficient to detect any 
al subjective bias to warrant a challenge 
cause ...." Id. at 932. The dissent, 
ever, fails to mention the following sent-
: "[bjecause it is not necessary to this 
'al, we do not decide whether the voir dire 
sufficient to reveal circumstances of rel-
iships that would warrant challenges for 
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cause ...." Id. 
Read in its full context, we believe that Horn-
sby supports our holding today. The trial 
judge in Hornsby asked one general question 
to the jury panel regarding whether the juror's 
affiliation with the L.D.S. Church would 
affect the juror's ability to be fair and impa-
rtial. This question was designed to detect any 
potential bias which would require further 
probing. Similarly, the trial judge in the 
instant case asked the jurors' if any of them 
had been the victim of a crime similar to that 
with which the defendant was charged. In Horn-
sby, no juror responded positively and, 
therefore, there was no need to probe further 
to investigate this potential bias. In the instant 
case, however, three jurors did respond affir-
matively. The fact that the Hornsby court was 
not required to probe further when no pote-
ntial bias was detected does not relieve the 
trial court in the instant case of its duty to 
probe further when potential bias was dete-
cted. 
We now turn to the sufficiency of the trial 
court's questioning in the instant case. Atte-
mpting to rebut the potential bias created 
when three jurors admitted to being victims of 
the same crime for which the defendant was 
on trial, the trial judge simply asked: 
Those three of you who have resp-
onded, recognizing that this is a 
different time and place and circu-
mstance, would that experience, 
having been the victim of that type 
of a crime, affect your ability to be 
fair and impartial in this case, that 
is, would you be unable to set aside 
that experience and hear the evid-
ence in this case and rule on the 
evidence based upon what you hear 
and the credibility of the witnesses? 
If you would not be able to do so, I 
want you to raise your hand. 
None of the jurors raised his hand, nor were 
any allowed to make a verbal response. We 
are concerned that the one general question 
was not sufficient to rebut the potential bias 
raised by juror VanLeeuwen's comment reg-
arding his prior victimization in light of the 
fact that the court posed this question only to 
the group of prospective jurors who had been 
victims of similar crimes without probing each 
individual juror separately to determine the 
effect of the experience on the particular 
juror. There was never a personalized dialogue 
which would have given VanLeeuwen a chance 
to express his latent feelings. 
Our concern about juror VanLeeuwen is 
further compounded by the fact that the trial 
judge initially agreed to remove all three pro-
spective jurors based upon their identical 
passive responses on the grounds that they had 
been victims of the same crime and, therefore, 
could not be impartial. Once a trial judge has 
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found that a juror should be removed for 
cause, it is highly unusual for this juror to be 
reinstated without further voir dire to develop 
new facts to support the change of direction.8 
The trial judge subsequently reinstated 
VanLeeuwen on the panel, explaining his 
extraordinary action by stating that VanLee-
uwen's experience had occurred in a foreign 
country and, therefore, would not affect his 
impartiality. The dissent relies on the second 
finding of the trial judge that VanLeeuwen 
could serve impartially. We are unpersuaded.-
The trial judge's conclusion came immediately 
after he had removed VanLeeuwen for cause, 
presumably because VanLeeuwen could not be 
fair and impartial. Subsequent to VanLee-
uwen's removal, the trial judge received no 
new information on which to logically base his 
conclusion that VanLeeuwen could act as a 
fair and impartial juror and thus should be 
reinstated. 
Additionally, there is no logical basis for 
assuming that a victim of an identical crime in 
a foreign country will be less biased. In actu-
ality, based on the meager information gath-
ered by the trial court, VanLeeuwen was obj-
ectively the most likely of the three previously 
victimized jurors to be biased. Juror Hoyt was 
the victim of theft and use of his credit card, 
not forgery. Additionally, although juror 
Tyler was the victim of an identical crime, that 
experience occurred thirty years ago in 1961. 
The remoteness of the incident suggests less 
possibility of current bias. In contrast, Van-
Leeuwen was the victim of a recent identical 
crime involving a substantial dollar amount. 
Based upon the totality of the circumstances 
involved in this voir dire, we cannot say the 
record supports a finding that VanLeeuwen 
was a fair and impartial prospective juror. 
Contrary to the statement of the dissent, we 
do not reverse this case based solely on the 
fact that only one question was asked by the 
trial judge.9 Our reversal is based on the tot-
ality of the circumstances surrounding voir 
dire. We are troubled that the three jurors 
were not questioned individually and each 
allowed to respond verbally. Additionally, 
VanLeeuwen's reinstatement was the product 
of an irregular procedure in that the trial 
judge originally removed VanLeeuwen for 
cause and then without further fact-gathering 
reversed his decision. Furthermore, we find no 
persuasive distinction between VanLeeuwen 
and the other two prospective jurors who had 
also been victims of similar crimes and who 
the trial judge presumably found could not be 
fair and impartial as he removed them for 
cause. We therefore reverse and remand for a 
new trial. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Pamela T..Greenwood, Judge 
*This opinion replaces the opinion of the same 
name issued on April 2, 1991. (157 Utah A 
Rep. 66) 
1. The dissent contends that VanLeeuwen was i 
stricken for cause at the sidebar conference, 
official jury list, however, indicates that all i 
jurors were initially removed for cause at this 
ference. On this list, the names of jurors F 
Tyler and VanLeeuwen are crossed out with 
notation "for cause" written next to all three nai 
Subsequently, the notation "foreign country" 
included next to juror VanLeeuwen's name, ii 
ating the judge felt that VanLeeuwen shouk 
reinstated because his experience occurred • 
foreign country. 
The dissent correctly states that since no re 
was made of the initial conference, "[w)e must 
... on the subsequent reconstruction of that coi 
ence made on the record ...." Contrary to 
dissent's assertion, however, this reconstruc 
support's defendant's view. Counsel for defen^  
reconstructed the conference as follows: 
I believe at the end of voir dire the 
Court gave me an opportunity to-or 
the Court asked me if I had any challe-
nges, if I passed the panel for cause, 
and I said no and approached the bench 
and I enumerated three individuals who 
I felt should be challenged for cause. 
Those individuals were Mr. Mark Hoyt, 
Mr. Chris VanLeeuwen, and Mr. James 
Tyler, and I believe at that time the 
Court did strike the three individuals for 
cause. The bases were they were victims 
of a similar crime to Mr. Woolley's, the 
Defendant in this case. 
Shortly thereafter the Court reinstated 
Mr. VanLeeuwen indicating that because 
the crime had been perpetrated in a 
foreign country that that was a signifi-
cant difference. 
Neither the state nor the court objected to • 
reconstruction in the record below. Furthermore, 
state does not assert a contrary view of the event 
its brief on appeal. 
The dissent correctly notes that subsequently, 
court did state that it "determined based 
[VanLeeux en'sj responses, not to strike him." 1 
language, however, is taken out of context a* 
refers not to the court's initial decision to rem 
VanLeeuwen but only to the court's subsequ 
final decision to leave VanLeeuwen on the panel. 
2. Previously, Utah courts have used different r 
aseology in defining the discretion afforded a t 
judge in dismissing a juror for cause. See, e 
Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 459 (motions to disre 
prospective jurors are within the sound discretion 
the trial court); State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (U* 
1984) (in reviewing jury selection, some defere: 
must be accorded the discretion of the trial cou 
State v. Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983) ( 
question of the partiality of prospective jur 
remains largely within the discretion of the t: 
court); Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 19' 
(applying the "some deference" standard); State 
Dixon, 560 P.2d 318 (Utah 1977) (matter of possi; 
bias or prejudice of jurors rests within the sot. 
discretion of the trial court); State v. Jonas, 
P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.denied, __P.2c 
(Utah 1990) (citing Gotschall as the approprL 
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standard of review); State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934 
(Utah CL App. 1990) (citing Gotschall as the appr-
opriate standard of review). We do not believe, 
however, the different wording has actually affected 
the extent of deference afforded on appeal. 
3. Although the Jenkins court applied a "some 
deference" standard rather than the "sound discre-
tion" standard, regardless of the standard applied, 
ihe judge's exercise of discretion must be viewed in 
light of this factor. 
4. See, e.g., State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 
1989) (holding that defendant was entitled to new 
trial where prosecutor struck Hispanic juror to get 
even with defense counsel who had insisted that 
Hispanics be included on the panel); State v. Pike, 
"'l: P.2d 277, 279-81 (Utah 1988) (discussing rati-
onale for presumption of prejudice where improper 
contact between jurors and witnesses or court pers-
onnel occurs). 
5. The dissent notes that in 1988, the United States 
Supreme Court held in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
81 (1988) that as long as the jury which actually sat 
for the case was impartial, it is unimportant that 
defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge 
to excuse a prospective juror. The dissent then states 
that if we find that VanLeeuwen should have been 
removed for cause, we must reevaluate the Hewitt 
line of cases in light of Ross. 
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with this 
precise issue in 1989 in Gotschall and Julian after Ross 
was decided. We assume that the court consi-
dered Ross when deciding Gotschall and Julian, but 
chose to stay with its longstanding rule that "[a] 
court commits prejudicial error if it forces a party 
to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a 
prospective juror who should have been removed for 
cause." Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; see also Julian, 
771 P.2d at 1064 n.l l . Accordingly, we assume this 
is still the law in Utah. 
6. This test was summarized in Cobb when the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "[w)hen comments are 
made which facially question a prospective juror's 
impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion may 
occur unless the challenged juror is removed by the 
court or unless the court or counsel investigates and 
finds the inference rebutted." Cobb, 114 P.2d at 
1126. 
7. The dissent cites Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1123, as a 
case in which the circumstances are "similar" to 
those of the instant case. The juror in Cobb referred 
to by the dissent disclosed during voir dire that she 
had known the prosecutor 15 years earlier when he 
was a senior in high school. In comparing Cobb to 
the instant case, however, the dissent fails to ackn-
owledge several important distinguishing facts. First, 
unlike our case, the juror was individually questi-
oned and asked to explain the relationship and 
whether it would affect her impartiality. Further-
more, the use of the language that the relationship 
"was not that which would warrant an inference of 
bias" is taken out of context as it comes in light of 
her answers to the questions probing her potential 
bias. Additionally, the Cobb court did not engage in 
the extraordinary practice of initially dismissing a 
juror for cause and then inexplicably reinstating him 
as did the trial court in the instant case. 
8. The initial removal of the three challenged jurors 
and subsequent reinstatement of juror VanLeeuwen 
took place during a sidebar conference outside the 
presence of the court reporter. Consequently, no 
record of this conference was made. 
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9. The dissent faults defense counsel for not asking 
for further questions to probe the potential bias of 
the three jurors, claiming that this failure constit-
uted a waiver of defendant's right to complain on 
appeal. This criticism ignores the fact that after the 
judge's questioning, counsel moved to remove all 
three jurors for cause. This motion was granted 
and, therefore, there was no logical reason for 
counsel to encourage the court to probe further at 
that time. 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
The majority concludes that the trial court 
abused its discretion because it did not make 
adequate inquiry. Either the majority is req-
uiring rehabilitative-like inquiry in all cases 
where there is only a question of potential 
bias, or it is holding for the first time that 
there is a per se inference of bias that must be 
rebutted whenever a prospective juror has 
previously been a victim of a similar crime. 
Both approaches are a departure from our 
established case law. I believe the trial court 
conducted adequate inquiry once the question 
of potential bias arose because there was no 
inference of bias or actual bias evidenced by 
prospective juror VanLeeuwen's comments. 
Further, I believe that the defendant waived 
any objection to the extent or manner of voir 
dire conducted and has therefore not preserved 
that issue for appeal; alternatively, defendant 
has not satisfied his burden on appeal to 
demonstrate that VanLeeuwen could not have 
been impartial. 
DEGREES OF "BIAS" 
There are three degrees of "bias" that may 
surface during voir dire: a question of poten-
tial bias, an inference of bias, and actual bias. 
The extent of inquiry to be conducted by a 
trial court depends on which degree of bias 
surfaces. If a prospective juror has previously 
been the victim of a similar crime, there is a 
legitimate question as to whether that experi-
ence has caused the prospective juror to 
become biased. When such a question arises, 
the trial court must probe to determine 
whether the prospective juror is, in fact, 
impartial in spite of the past experience. 
Typically this is accomplished by the trial 
court simply asking if the juror can be impa-
rtial. See, e.g., State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 
(Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 
(Utah 1990); Hornsby v. Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 
932 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). If after probing the 
prospective juror's state of mind the trial 
court is satisfied that the prospective juror is 
nevertheless impartial, that is the end of the 
inquiry. 
If, on the other hand, the prospective juror, 
in response to such probing, makes comments 
that "facially question a prospective juror's 
partiality or prejudice," the court will infer 
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bias as a matter o( law. Scare v. Cobb, 774 
P.2d 1123, 1126-28 (Utah 1989). Once an 
inference of bias occurs because of comments 
made by the prospective juror, the trial court 
must either remove the prospective juror or 
rebut the inference with further inquiry. Id. at 
1126. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 605 P,2d 765, 
768 (Utah 1980) (trial court failed to remove 
or inquire further of prospective juror who 
stated that he would give greater weight to 
testimony of peace officer). An inference of 
bias is rebutted when the rehabilitative inquiry 
shows that a prospective juror is "willing to 
keep an open mind and apply the law as the 
court instructs]." Cobb, 114 P.2d at 1127. 
Questions of bias and inferences of bias are 
not to be confused with actual bias as evide-
nced by a prospective juror's "attitude of 
bias" or "strong feelings" that indicate the 
prospective juror has a closed mind. Once 
such strong feelings are revealed, a prospective 
juror may not sit, even if the prospective juror 
later asserts that he or she can render an 
impartial verdict. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 
473, 475 (Utah 1987) (prospective jurors knew 
the murder victim's family and expressed 
strong feelings of bias); Srare v. Brooks, 631 
P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981) (prior victims of 
crime expressed strong feelings of anger and 
frustration about their victimization); State v. 
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26-27 (Utah 1989) 
(prospective juror had strong and deep impr-
essions and would not indicate that he could 
be impartial). Obviously, if a prospective 
juror's comments indicate that he or she has a 
closed mind then he or she must be removed 
for cause and no amount of inquiry will be 
sufficient to rehabilitate. Jones, 734 P.2d at 
475. Although no claim is made that VanLe-
euwen was in fact biased, the majority never-
theless erroneously seeks to apply the actual 
bias analysis to the present case. 
The majority opinion falters because it fails 
to recognize the differences between a 
"question of potential bias" that arises because 
of a fact situation, an "inference of bias" that 
arises because of a prospective juror's com-
ments, and "actual bias" that arises when a 
juror reveals strong and deep impressions of 
bias. A prospective juror who is found to be 
impartial following the general probing that 
occurs when a question of potential bias arises 
clearly does not need to go through rehabilit-
ative inquiry in order to ensure that he or she 
will act impartially. 
The fact that a prospective juror was prev-
iously a victim of a similar crime raises a ques-
tion about potential bias which requires 
general probing into the prospective juror's 
state of mind in light of that experience. 
However, unless the prospective juror makes 
comments that facially bring into question his 
or her impartiality, there is no inference of 
bias raised, see, e.g., Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25-
26, nor is there actual bias shown, see, e.g., 
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Jones, 734 P.2d at 475. The trial court m\ 
find any inference of bias, or determine tl 
actual bias exists, "based upon the juror's <. 
pressed feelings, attitudes, and opinion^ 
Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884 (emphasis addec 
Because the trial court did not find an in ft 
ence of bias in this case, there was obviou^ 
no need for it to conduct further inquiry 
rebut such an inference. 
In State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1126, a pr 
spective juror indicated that she was acqu 
nted with the prosecutor. The revelation • 
this fact raised a question of potential bi. 
that required additional probing. The probi: 
revealed that she had known him fifteen yea 
earlier when he was a senior in high schoc 
He had been friends with her daughter and t! 
two families had belonged to the same chun 
group. When asked if her association with t) 
prosecutor would have caused her to 1 
swayed to his side, she responded that 
would not. The supreme court held that tl 
trial court did not err in refusing to dismi 
the prospective juror for cause because tl 
prospective juror's answers revealed that he 
acquaintance with the prosecutor "was not tr 
type of relationship that would warrant an h 
ference of bias." Id. (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the trial court asked & 
prospective jurors to raise a hand if they coul 
not try the case based only on the evident 
they heard. No hands were raised. The tru 
court also asked the panel members to raise 
hand if there were any reasons they could nc 
be impartial in deciding defendant's guilt o 
innocence. None of the jurors did. The tria 
court then questioned whether the jurors, i 
placed in the position of either the defendar 
or the State, would be satisfied by being trie 
by a juror of the panel member's frame o 
mind or attitude toward the case. Once again 
none of he jurors gave any response indica 
ting potential bias. 
After the trial court had concluded its ow; 
voir dire, it invited counsel to ask their owi 
questions, directed through the court. Defense 
counsel requested that the prospective juror 
be asked if they had ever been victims o 
crimes similar to that of which the defendant 
was accused. Three answered in the affirma 
tive. The experiences of each prospective juro^ 
were briefly related. The trial court then askec 
all three prior victims whether they could se: 
aside their prior experiences and act in a fai: 
and impartial manner. 
Those three of you who have 
responded, recognizing that this is a 
different time and place and circu-
mstance, would that experience, 
having been the victim of that type 
of a crime, affect your ability to be 
fair and impartial in this case, that 
is, would you be unable to set aside 
that experience and hear the evid-
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ence in this case and rule on the 
evidence based upon what you hear 
and the credibility of the witnesses? 
If you would not be able to do so, I 
want you to raise your hand. 
(Emphasis added.) 
one of those questioned raised a hand. 
The only fault the majority finds in this case 
that the trial court did not ask enough 
jestions before concluding that VanLeeuwen 
as impartial.1 Once the trial court is satisfied 
tat a prospective juror is impartial, however, 
lere is no reason for it to continue with 
nnecessary questioning. The scope of the 
tquiry, is left to the sound discretion of the 
ial court because only the trial court knows 
hen it is satisfied that the prospective jurors 
re impartial. See Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932. See 
Iso State v. Gotshall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 
Jtah 1989); Jonas, 793 P.2d at 906.2 The 
etermination of whether or not a prospective 
aror is impartial is a factual determination 
lade from the "advantaged position" of the 
rial court to determine "which persons would 
ie fair and impartial jurors." Jenkins v. 
>arrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981). The 
najority therefore faults the procedure used 
>y the trial court in reaching its factual 
inding. I, on the other hand, believe the 
nquiry was procedurally sufficient. 
The single question asked by the trial court 
>nce it had heard the experiences of the three 
Drior victims is similar to that asked in Hornsby, 
758 P.2d 902, wherein the trial court 
nquired: 
Are there any of you who feel that 
you would have trouble being an 
impartial juror because of feelings 
you may have either pro or con 
with regard to the L.D.S. Church 
that you think might affect your 
ability to be a fair and impartial 
juror in this case? If so, I'd like 
you to raise your hand. 
Id. at 931 (emphasis added). 
As in the present case, none of the prospe-
ctive jurors raised a hand. We recognized in 
Hornsby that one of the purposes of voir dire 
is the "detection of bias sufficient to challenge 
for cause." Id. at 932. We then held that "the 
question asked by the trial court was sufficient 
to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant 
a challenge for cause under subsection (6) [of 
Rule 47(0, Utah R. Civ. P.] ." Id. (emphasis 
added).3 The majority asserts that one ques-
tion was not sufficient and relies upon Bailey, 
605 P.2d 768 and Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884. 
Bailey and Brooks, however, apply only when 
there is a strong inference of bias, and that is 
not the case before us. 
The question asked in the present case 
cannot be distinguished from that asked in 
Hornsby. The majority fails to show any 
defect at all in the question asked.4 Nor does 
it put forth any additional questions that 
should have been asked.5 Instead, it relies only 
upon the total number of questions asked in 
the cases that it cites as support without any 
analysis of the substance of those questions.6 
An examination of many of those cases reveals 
that the higher number of questions resulted 
not from rehabilitative questioning, but from 
the prospective jurors giving equivocal answers 
when asked if they could be impartial.7 
In the present case, the prospective jurors' 
answers were unequivocal and therefore did 
not require any additional inquiry. Absent 
some explanation as to why the inquiry con-
ducted by the trial court was insufficient, we 
may not say that the trial court abused its 
discretion in not inquiring further. We certa-
inly may not declare the trial court's finding 
to be clearly erroneous simply because it did 
not first ask a magical number of questions. 
Another distinction that should be drawn 
between the present case and the cases relied 
upon by the majority is that in many of those 
cases counsel, not the trial court, conducted 
the extended inquiry. See, e.g., State v. Julian, 
111 P.2d 1061, 1065-66 (Utah 1989) (defense 
counsel asked the twenty questions referred to 
by the majority, not the trial court). Rule 
18(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides counsel an opportunity to ask addi-
tional questions with leave of the trial court. 
Defense counsel in the present case requested 
the question regarding prior victimization, but 
did not request any additional probing once 
the victimization question and the trial court's 
follow-up question regarding impartiality 
were asked. Defendant's failure to object to 
the extent of the voir dire conducted by the 
trial court "constitutes a waiver and bars 
inquiry into the bias question." State v. 
DeWille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988) 
(defendant's evidence of juror bias discovered 
post-trial was properly refused by trial court 
in motion for new trial when "quite foresee-
able" issue of potential bias was not raised by 
defendant during voir dire). See also State v. 
Miller, 614 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983) (trial 
court failed to inquire of jurors whether there 
would be prejudice in their minds because the 
case involved a motorcycle club; defense 
counsel's failure to object, to remind the 
judge of the oversight, to make a new request, 
or to ask personally to voir dire the jury, 
effectively waived the error). Defendant has 
therefore not preserved the issue for appeal.8 
See Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (plaintiff waived any objection 
at trial when it did not attempt to call the 
court's attention to a specific question it 
desired the court to ask on voir dire and 
thereby did not preserve the issue for appeal). 
Even if defendant had preserved the issue 
for appeal, he failed to meet his burden of 
proof on appeal. "Defendant did not demon-
strate on the trial record, or on appeal, that 
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[the prospective juror] could not act in a fair 
and impartial manner." Layton City v. 
Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (citing Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884). See also 
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 
S.Ct. 2273, 2277 (1988) (defendant "failed to 
establish that the jury was not impartial"), 
Nor has defendant demonstrated that he was 
not "afforded an adequate opportunity to gain 
the information necessary to evaluate" Van-
Leeuwen. Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932. "The 
trial court abuses its discretion when, 
'considering the totality of the questioning, 
counsel [is not] afforded an adequate oppor-
tunity to gain the information necessary to 
evaluate jurors.'" Id. (quoting Bishop, 753 
P.2d at 448). Defendant has simply failed to 
show how VanLeeuwen was partial, or how he 
was prevented in any way from gaining suffi-
cient information about VanLeeuwen to know 
whether he was partial 
The majority cannot say that the trial court 
did not conduct adequate inquiry simply 
because it might have conducted more. Once 
the trial court was satisfied that the prospec-
tive jurors were impartial, it did not need to 
probe any further. If defense counsel was not 
satisfied that the prior victims were impartial, 
then it should have requested additional 
probing.9 The trial court therefore did not 
abuse its discretion in asking only one ques-
tion when the question asked was "sufficient 
to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant 
a challenge for cause." Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 
932 (emphasis added). 
PER SE INFERENCE OF BIAS 
Since VanLeeuwen made no comments to 
call into question his impartiality, no inference 
of bias was raised under our traditional anal-
ysis. Bias is only inferred when the "comments" 
of the prospective juror raise a facial ques-
tion as to the prospective juror's partiality. 
Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1126 (emphasis added). Ac-
cord Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25-26 (fact that 
prospective juror had prior involvement in 
drug abuse and distribution investigations did 
not create an inference of bias where no 
comments were made to call into question his 
impartiality).10 The majority's ruling expressly 
requires trial courts to rebut an inference of 
bias whenever the court learns of prior victi-
mization. The majority's ruling therefore 
creates a per se inference of bias that attaches 
automatically whenever a prospective juror is 
a prior victim of a similar crime. The majority 
fails to provide any legal or public policy 
support for such a ruling. The majority's 
approach, in fact, is contrary to our case iaw.n 
A recent decision from this court indicates 
that prior victimization of a similar crime does 
not, per se, raise an inference of bias. In State 
v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.) cert, 
denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), a prospe-
ctive juror revealed during voir dire that s 
had recently been the victim of a theft in\t 
ving approximately $13,000 worth of tooi 
When asked whether the previous theft wou. 
affect her impartiality, the prospective jun 
answered, "If it was tools, I might be a litt 
influenced/' Id. at 906. She equivocate 
further by admitting that it was "a little har 
to say" whether the prior incident would affe 
her ability to be impartial, but eventual I 
affirmed her ability to remain impartial upc 
further questioning by the trial court. Id. Th 
court held that no inference of bias wa 
demonstrated by the voir dire questionin 
because, although the prospective juror exp, 
essed some equivocation, she ultimately mar 
ifested her ability to be impartial. Id. at 90~ 
This court reasoned that since the case did nc 
involve tools, "it could be inferred that th 
prior experience would not influence her a 
all." Id. Such reasoning reveals that prio 
victimization does not automatically raise . 
per se inference of bias that must be rebutted 
See State v. Rose, 121 Ariz. 131, 589 P.2d 5 
13-14 (1978); State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 
402 A.2d 203, 207 (1979). 
The majority summarily assumes, however 
as a matter of law and in a technical fashion 
that all prior victims are not indifferent to the 
case before them. "'Impartiality' is not a 
technical conception but is a state of mind; \\ 
is a mental attitude of appropriate indiffer-
ence." Srare v. Brooks, 565 P.2d 799, 801 
(Utah 1977). If the prior victimization of the 
prospective juror in Jonas did not prevent her 
from being indifferent, then there is no reason 
to assume that VanLeeuwen's prior victimiz-
ation prevented him from being indifferent. In 
general, prospective jurors who affirm their 
impartiality are presumed to be impartial 
unless proven otherwise. See State v. Dixon, 
560 P.2d 318, 320 (Utah 1977) (when prospe-
ctive jurors "gave their word that they had no 
such bias or prejudice but could act as fair 
jurors[,] [i]t is to be assumed that they were 
not swearing falsely and that they believed 
they could act as conscientious arbiters in the 
case."). 
Victimization of minor crimes is an unfor-
tunate part of living in today's society. I do 
not believe that the risk of universal bias 
among prior victims is so great that it warr-
ants a per se inference of bias that must aut-
omatically be rebutted in each and every case. 
In a great majority of the cases, a general 
probing, such as the probing conducted by the 
trial court in this case, will be sufficient to 
reveal those prior victims who might not be 
impartial. The majority's ruling will therefore 
create a significant burden upon our trial 
courts without creating any real benefit. 
CONCLUSION 
I respectfully dissent from the majority's 
holding because it requires prospective jurors 
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be rehabilitated before any inference of bias 
> even been established. I view the trial 
jrt's decision to have been a factual deter-
nation that VanLeeuwen was impartial and 
before was capable of sitting on the jury 
thout any rehabilitative inquiry. Inasmuch 
VanLeeuwen said nothing that would faci-
y challenge his impartiality, we should give 
s trial court's factual determination the 
ference it deserves. 
The majority asserts that the approach rec-
;nized in this dissent would be difficult to 
Iminister. Let me summarize the approach in 
, simplest terms. When facts raise a question 
* whether a prospective juror may be biased, 
e trial court must probe until it is satisfied 
iat the prospective juror is in fact impartial. 
a prospective juror makes comments that 
IOW he or she is probably biased, then the 
ial court must ask questions to rebut that 
iference. If a prospective juror makes com-
lents that reveal strong and deep impressions 
f bias, no rehabilitative inquiry is needed--
iat juror must be removed. I believe this 
pproach is much simpler and" gives more 
uidance to our trial courts than simply saying 
hat the amount of inquiry needed will vary 
rom case to case and in this case it just 
imply was not enough. 
I also believe that this issue was not prop-
rly preserved for appeal and that, even if it 
vas, defendant has failed to meet his burden 
)f showing that VanLeeuwen could not have 
icted in a fair and impartial manner or that he 
vas prevented from obtaining enough infor-
nation to make that determination.12 
I would therefore affirm. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. The majority claims that the record does not 
support a finding that VanLeeuwen was a fair and 
impartial juror. The burden of challenging this 
factual finding, however, has not been met by def-
endant. "In the absence of a record or transcript 
supporting defendant's factual contentions on 
appeal, and upon defendant's failure to marshal 
evidence that shows the ruling to be clearly erron-
eous, we presume that the ruling is adequately sup-
ported by the clear weight of the evidence." Srare v. 
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (citations omitted). 
Even if the defendant were to marshal the evid-
ence in support of the trial court's finding--
which includes the four affirmative, unequivocal 
responses by VanLeeuwen that he could be impartial-
-there is no evidence of bias on the record to show 
that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. 
The majority is therefore left to attack the proce-
dure used by the trial court in order to show any 
abuse of discretion. In addition to its concerns 
about the extent of the inquiry, the majority indic-
ates that it is bothered by the fact there was no 
individualized questioning of the three prospectse 
jurors, but it offers no precedent or analysis to 
support its assertion that individualized questioning 
is required. In the past, this court has accepted 
collective questioning without comment. See, e.g., 
Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 931. 
2. Contrary to the majority's assertion in its second 
footnote, there is a real distinction between the 
phraseology used in expressing the appropriate sta-
ndard of review. If a matter is within the "sound 
discretion" of a trial court, then the appellate courts 
will give maximum deference to the trial court's 
determination. The granting of only "some defer-
ence" is obviously a more searching review. The 
majority claims to be giving maximum deference 
when in fact it is granting only "some deference/ if 
that much, to the trial court's determination of the 
appropriate scope of voir dire. Inasmuch as Gotsc-
hall is the most recent Utah Supreme Court case, I 
believe that the "sound discretion" standard enunc-
iated therein governs our review in this case and that 
the majority's departure therefrom is error. 
3. The majority erroneously describes this statement 
as dicta. At issue in Hornsby was whether the voir 
dire was sufficient with regards to the prospective 
jurors' feelings toward the L.D.S. Church. Voir 
dire has two functions, "the detection of bias suffi-
cient to challenge for cause," and "the collection of 
data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory 
challenge." Srare v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 
1983). In Hornsby, we first reviewed the detection 
of bias issue and found that the single question was 
sufficient to detect bias for purposes of subsection 
(6) of Rule 47(0- We did not consider "whether the 
voir dire was sufficient to reveal circumstances or 
relationships that would warrant challenges for 
cause under other subsections of Rule 47(f)," 
because that issue was not necessary to the appeal. 
Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932 (emphasis added). 
Instead, we reversed the case because the voir dire 
was insufficient to permit the plaintiff an opportu-
nity to collect data for the informed use of the 
peremptory challenge. The majority's partial quote 
is therefore misleading because it implies that we did 
not make any decision relating to challenges for 
cause, when in fact we expressly made such a ruling 
under subsection (6). 
4. The majority attempts to distinguish Hornsby by 
pointing out that there were no affirmative respo-
nses to the general question asked in Hornsby while 
there were positive responses in the present case. 
The majority's analysis, however, ignores the fact 
that the ultimate issue of impartiality addressed by 
one question in Hornsby was addressed by two 
questions in this case. The Hornsby court asked if 
the prospective jurors had any feelings toward the 
L.D.S. Church that would prevent them from being 
impartial. If the Hornsby court had broken this 
question into two parts and first asked, "does any 
prospective juror have feelings towards the L.D.S. 
Church," it probably would have received affirma-
tive responses. Conversely, had the trial court in the 
present case asked the single question, "have any of 
you been the victim of a similar crime that would 
prevent you from being impartial," it would not 
have received any affirmative responses. The inter-
mediate positive response, that the majority claims 
distinguishes this case from Hornsby, simply is not 
determinative because the ultimate response was the 
same-the prospective jurors would be impartial. 
5. The trial court had already asked three different 
questions designed to elicit any bias before the issue 
of prior victimization even arose in this case. Inas-
much as we must look at the "totality" of the voir 
dire in order to determine whether a trial court has 
abused its discretion, State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
448 (Utah 1988), the majority errs in not considering 
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the impact of these previous questions as well. 
When the totality ot the voir dire is considered, it is 
clear that the three questions initially asked by the 
trial court, plus the question following the discovery 
of the prior victimization, were "sufficient to detect 
any actual subjective bias to warrant a challenge for 
cause." Hornsby, 758 P,2d at 932. 
6. in general, the types of questions fall into three 
groups: (1) factual questions regarding the prospe-
ctive juror's experiences; (2) questions probing the 
prospective juror's self-perceived state of mind 
and whether those experiences would affect his or 
her ability to act impartially; and (3) questions reb-
utting inferences of bias by inquiring whether the 
prospective juror understands his or her role and is 
willing to be impartial. The majority fails to cons-
ider whether the questions asked in the cases cited 
are factual, probing, or rehabilitative. Absent such 
analysis, the cases cited are useless in determining 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in the 
present case. 
7. The following voir dire colloquy between the trial 
court and a prospective juror in Jonas is a prime 
example of extended inquiry due to equivocal 
answers. 
THE COURT: All right. I almost hate 
to ask this question, but I'm obligated 
to. Have any of you been the victims of 
a theft? And that, as I've indicated to 
you before what a theft really is, taking 
property of another with intent to per-
manently deprive them, or in receiving. 
Well, we'll take that first. 1 saw some 
hands go up in the jury box .... 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
Yes, my husband had about $13,000 
worth of tools stolen about a year and a 
half ago which we have never-
THE COURT: Did a criminal act 
result from that~or action? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
No, it was reported to the police, which 
they didn't do anything about, and we 
still have never gotten-
THE COURT: They didn't find it? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
(shook head from side to side) 
THE COURT: How long ago was 
that? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
About a year and a half ago. 
THE COURT: Keeping that incident 
in mind, as I indicated, there are diffe-
rent parties involved, but sometimes 
based on our experience we allow thai to 
interfere with our thinking. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
It might be. If it was tools, I might be a 
little influenced. 
THE COURT: Well, wait just a 
minute. Let me ask the questions and 
you just answer the question. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
All right. 
THE COURT: Bearing that in mind, 
do you believe that that incident would 
make it difficult for you to be fair and 
impartial, particularly to this Defendant, 
a well as the people of the state of 
Utah? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
^uuney CODE • co 
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It's a little hard to say. 
THE COURT: Well, you just take 
time to think it over because we-
you're the one that-
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
It probably would, yes. 
THE COURT: Let's see. You're Mrs.-
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
Smith, Donna Smith. 
THE COURT: You don't believe that 
you could set those facts aside and make 
a determination on the evidence that's 
presented in this case? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
I—well, yes, I believe I could be 
impartial. 
Jonas, 793 P.2d at 905-06. 
8. Contrary to the majority's assertion that the 
motion to strike was granted as to all three prior 
victims, and therefore defense counsel did not need 
to ask for further probing to preserve the issue, the 
record reveals that Hoyt and Tyler were removed, 
but that VanLeeuwen was never removed. 
No record was made of the actual sidebar confe-
rence at which time defendant claims VanLeeuwen 
was removed and reinstated, but the conference was 
later reconstructed on the record. We must therefore 
rely upon the subsequent reconstruction of that 
conference made on the record. Slate v. Suarez, 793 
P.2d 934, 936 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Defense 
counsel rehearsed how it had made a motion to 
remove Hoyt, Tyler and VanLeeuwen and then 
stated: "I believe at that time the Court did strike 
the three individuals for cause .... Shortly thereafter 
the Court reinstated Mr. VanLeeuwen ...." The trial 
court stated that it was the court's view at the 
sidebar conference that all three prospective jurors 
could be fair and impartial and that the state's 
objection to striking VanLeeuwen was particularly 
well taken because his experience occurred in a 
foreign country. The trial court then indicated that 
at sidebar it "determined based on his responses not 
to strike him." (Emphasis added). Defense counsel 
did not make any protest to the trial court's asser-
tion that it did not strike VanLeeuwen. 
Defense counsel's statement that VanLeeuwen 
was stricken and later reinstated is without any 
support in the transcript and is directly contrary to 
the trial court's express declaration that it did not 
strike VanLeeuwen. Defense counsel therefore did 
not preserve the issues of insufficient inquiry or the 
alleged irregular "reinstatement" of VanLeeuwen. 
See id. The only issue properly preserved for appeal 
is the question of whether VanLeeuwen should have 
been dismissed for cause based on the answers given. 
9. Had defendant so requested, additional questions 
could have been posed to the three prospective 
jurors after defendant made its request to strike for 
cause and before the trial court ruled on the motion. 
See, e.g., Gotsehall, 782 P.2d at 461; Salt Lake City 
v. Tuero, 758 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
10. The majority misconstrues "comments" as 
meaning VanLeeuwen's statement that he was a 
prior victim. Such an interpretation is clearly not 
consistent with the analysis of Brooks. "Whenever 
the voir dire evokes a strong emotional response, 
there is posed a warning that the juror may not have 
the appropriate indifference to the party or cause 
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^r'cre the court." Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884 
emrnasis addeoi. VanLeeuwen's response in this 
;a>e obviously *as not a "strong emotional resp-
The majont> iAso misconstrues the language of 
Coc? by asserting that the inference that arises from 
rncr victimization must be rebutted, but that the 
prospective juror need not necessarily be removed. 
Such an approach is a clear departure from Cobb, 
*hich requires the prospective juror to be removed 
,f an inference of bias is not rebutted. Cobb, 774 
P.2d at 1126. 
11. The majority's approach is also contrary to our 
established rules of procedure. Fact situations that 
raise a concern serious enough to create a per se 
inference of bias are enumerated in rule 18(e) of the 
Ltah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Prior victimiz-
jtion is not one of those per se grounds. Rule 
18(e)(4), for example, provides that the following 
fact situations automatically constitute grounds for 
remo\ ing a prospective juror: 
the existence of any social, legal, busi-
ness, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any 
party, witness or person alleged to have 
been victimized or injured by the defe-
ndant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable 
minds that the prospective juror would 
be unable or unwilling to return a 
verdict which would be free of favori-
tism. 
United Parcel v. Industrial Commission 
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places it squarely before us now. 
12. The majority fails to adequately address an alt-
ernative basis for affirmance that has been properly 
raised and is before us. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC 
Usocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988). Van-
I ccuwen did not sit as a juror, but was removed on 
a peremptory challenge by defendant. The law in 
this jurisdiction has historically been that it is prej-
udicial error for the trial court "to compel a party 
;o exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a juror 
*ho should have been removed for cause." Hewitt, 
^9 P.2d at 25. The State urges that if this court 
mds that VanLeeuwen should have been removed 
'or cause, as the majority does, then we must reev-
aluate the Hewitt line of cases in light of the recent 
*a* of Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 
:r< (1988). The United States Supreme Court held 
Vrcin that where a juror who should have been 
reused for cause was rem ved by defendant's 
peremptory challenge, "[ajny claim that the jury was 
~w mpartial was required to focus, not on [the 
m~*d jurorj, but on the jurors who ultimately 
*i * 108 S.Ct. at 2277. The Supreme Court reas-
**d that as long as the jury which actually sat for 
V .asc was impartial, it was unimportant that 
Vrr.dant was forced to use a peremptory challenge 
•a noise a prospective juror. 108 S.Ct. at 2278 
«*! Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 436, 7 S.Ct. 
M4.M6CI887)). 
'" e^vv of the majority's reversal, this alternative 
iTjsxnt deserves discussion. The majority errone-
xv>
 'assumes" that this issue has been considered 
s
 'Se Ltah Supreme Court since it has decided two 
*"« -emoval cases subsequent to the Ross decision 
^ ^ *Mied bv the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as 
•!^4?c courts are limited to the issues properly 
*" ^
n aPP^aI, the majority's assumption is unf-
x
***vl Since the Utah Supreme Court has never 
* • • - sue directly, the majority's ruling W^NVcd thl« 
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OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Petitioners, United Parcel and/or Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company, appeal from the 
Industrial Commission's Order awarding res-
pondent Lyman compensation for injuries 
sustained on July 22, 1981. United Parcel 
claims that the Industrial Commission lacked 
jurisdiction to award such compensation due 
to Lyman's failure to timely file the requisite 
claim for compensation under Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-99 (Supp. 1981). We find that 
the Commission lacked jurisdiction and ther-
efore reverse the Commission's Order. 
FACTS 
Lyman's accident occurred on July 22, 
1981. In August 1981, United Parcel discha-
rged Lyman for reasons unrelated to the acc-
ident. Lyman sought medical treatment for a 
back injury, which culminated in surger. for a 
herniated disk in September 1981. L>man's 
physicians filed medical reports with the Ind-
ustrial Commission (Commission), with copies 
to Liberty Mutual Insurance, which were rec-
eived on September 17, 1981. On September 
22, 1981, United Pared filed a report of the 
injury with the Commission. Lyman's physi-
cians also filed progress notes on November 2, 
1981 and December 18, 1981. 
On or about September 28, 1982, the 
Commiss ion rece ived the " I n s u r a n c e 
ADDENDUM B 
1 , officer? 
i 
2 ' THE COURT: I will instruct you, members of the 
3 ' ]ury panel, at a later point in this trial that you are to 
4 give no more or less credibility to the testimony of a law 
5 I enforcement official than you would to any other witness. 
6 ' The fact that they are employed as a law enforcement officer 
7 does not give more or less credibility to their testimony. 
i 
8 Now, having stated that, are there any among you who are so 
9 persuaded that law enforcement officers are more credible or 
10 less credible than other witnesses that you couldn't be fair 
11 and impartial in judging their testimony? If so, raise your 
12 hand. 
13 No hands are raised. 
14 MR. LOYD: Thank you, your Honor. Could you 
15 i inquire if any of them — I believe you asked them if any of 
the jurors had been accused of a forgery type crime. Could 
you ask if any of their close friends or relatives have ever 
been the victim of forgery, theft, or any crime involving 
fraud or pecuniary loss? 







 members of the panel, who have yourselves been the victim of 
22 a forgery or a crime involving deception or fraud? If so, I 
23
 J want you to raise your hand. 
4 !
 Mr. Hoyt, you yourself have been the victim of 
2 cr [ 
J
 • such a circumstance? 
32 
, MR. HOYT: Yes, sir. My wallet was taken when I 
2 was m California and my credit card was used. 
3 THE COURT: Very well, and Mr. VanLeeuwen? 
4 MR. VANLEEUWEN: I was in Brazil at the time that 
5 they stole checks and wrote about five grand on my account. 
6 THE COURT: Very well. No other hands are raised, 
? Counsel. 
8 Those of you, Messrs. Hoyt and VanLeeuwen, who 
9 have responded to that question — oh, excuse me. 
10 Mr. Tyler? 
11 MR. TYLER: Yes, I was robbed of some checks and a 
12 guy forged some checks on my when I lived in L.A. in f61. 
13 THE COURT: Very well. Thank you, Mr. Tyler. No 
14 other hands are raised. 
15 Those three of you who have responded, recognizing 
that this is a different time and place and circumstance, 
would that experience, having been the victim of that type 
of a crime, affect your ability to be fair and impartial in 
this case, that is, would you be unable to set aside that 
experience and hear the evidence in this case and rule on 
! 
21 the evidence based upon what you hear and the credibility of 
22
 j the witnesses? If you would not be able to do so, I want 
2
^ | you to raise your hand. 







 MR. LOYD: Thank you, your Honor, 
33 
Members of the jury, at this point we'll take our 
noon recess given the fact that we could not really start 
another witness right now, and I will ask you to remember 
the admonition I've given you and to be back here at 1:30 
this afternoon, at which time we'll reconvene and hear the 
next witness. 
Court will be in recess until 1:30 this afternoon. 
Counsel, we'll discuss further the issue that 
we've talked about before when we reconvene this afternoon. 
Court will be in recess until 1:30. 
(Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: The Defendant and counsel are present. 
We are outside the hearing of the jury. 
Mr. Loyd, I'm now giving you the opportunity to 
make your record with regard to the challenge for cause as 
to Mr. VanLeeuwen. You may proceed. 
MR. LOYD: Thank you, your Honor. 
I believe at the end of voir dire the Court gave 
me an opportunity to — or the Court asked me if I had any 
challenges, if I passed the panel for cause, and I said no 
and approached the bench and I enumerated three individuals 
who I felt should be challenged for cause. Those individ-
uals were Mr. Mark Hoyt, Mr. Chris VanLeeuwen, and Mr. James 
Tyler, and I believe at that time the Court did strike the 
three individuals for cause. The bases were they were 
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victims of a similar crime to Mr. Woolley's, the Defendant 
in this case. 
Shortly thereafter the Court reinstated 
Mr. VanLeeuwen indicating that because the crime had been 
perpetrated in a foreign country that that was a significant 
difference. 
I would note that Mr. VanLeeuwen, if my recollec-
tion's correct and I believe it's on the record, had been 
the victim of a forgery, that his checkbook had been stolen, 
I believe, in Brazil and checks to the tune of $5,000 had 
been written on his account, and it's our contention that he 
should not have been replaced on the panel, that the chal-
lenge for cause was a good one, that he was the victim of 
the same sort of crime with which Mr. Woolley has been 
charged, and finally, as part of our peremptory challenges, 
in fact, with our first peremptory challenge we did strike 
Mr. VanLeeuwen from the panel because of his posture as a 
victim of this same sort of crime. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Loyd. 
Do you wish to respond, Mr. Cope? 
MR. COPE: I would like to add only, your Honor, 
that when Mr. Loyd made the motion to strike those three 
people for cause, that the State objected to the motion on 
the grounds that none of the three people had indicated that 
such an involvement in a theft would or had in any way 
75 
lored their thinking or prejudiced them as regards the 
-acts of this particular case. 
THE COURT: It is accurate to state that 
u,4 VanLeeuwen on voir dire examination indicated that he 
*.ad been a victim of a similar crime in the country of 
Brazil and had suffered some considerable loss as a result 
of that, along with the other two individuals on the panel, 
Messrs. Tyler and Hoyt. 
It was this Court's view that all three individ-
uals responded to the questioning about that experience 
bearing upon their ability to be fair and impartial, each of 
the three had indicated that they would be able to set aside 
that experience, itfs my recollection, and treat the evi-
dence in this case fairly and impartially, and it appeared 
to me that given the further indication that 
Mr. VanLeeuwen's experience did occur in a foreign country, 
that the objection to striking at least Mr. VanLeeuwen from 
that group for cause was well taken and I determined based 
upon his responses not to strike him. 
Accordingly, that is the rationale behind the 
Court's decision in this matter and I presume, Mr. Loyd, 
that your motion here is for mistrial. 
MR. LOYD: Yes, your Honor, that would be our 
requested relief. 
THE COURT: All right. Given the circumstances 
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1 that have been outlined in the record at this point, 
2 Counsel, I'll deny your motion. 
3 Let's bring the jury back in, Counsel. 
4 (Whereupon, the jury entered the courtroom.) 
5 THE COURT: The jury has returned to the 
6 courtroom. 
7 Mr. Cope, you may call your next witness. 
8 MR. COPE: Call Steven Blaylock. 
9 STEVEN CHARLES BLAYLOCK, 
10 called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
11 having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
12 follows: 
13 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR. COPE: 
15 I Q Would you please give us your full name? 
16 A Steven Charles Blaylock. 
17 Q And would you spell Blaylock for us? 
18 A B-1-a-y-l-o-c-k. 








A Yes, I am. 
Q And do you have a checking account, sir? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Do you ever write checks on that checking account? 
A Yes, I do. 
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ADDENDUM D 
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall 
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part: 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to 
a particular juror and may be taken on one or more 
of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications 
prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which 
renders one incapable of performing the duties 
of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the 
fourth degree to the person alleged to be 
injured by the offense charged, or on whose 
complaint the prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, 
witness or person alleged to have been 
victimized or injured by the defendant, which 
relationship when viewed objectively, would 
suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or unwilling 
to return a verdict which would be free of 
favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be 
disqualified solely because he is indebted to 
or employed by the state or a political 
subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse 
to the defendant in a civil action, or having 
complained against or having been accused by 
him in a criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which 
found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which 
has tried another person for the particular 
offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally 
sworn to try the same charge, and whose verdict 
was set aside, or which was discharged without 
a verdict after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil 
action brought against the defendant for the 
act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable 
with death, the entertaining of such 
conscientious opinions about the death penalty 
as would preclude the juror from voting to 
impose the death penalty following conviction 
regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year 
preceding, has been engaged or interested in 
carrying on any business, calling or 
employment, the carrying on of which is a 
violation of law, where defendant is charged 
with a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either 
for or against the defendant on the preliminary 
examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an 
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the 
defendant is guilty or not guilty of the 
offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the cause, 
or to either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of the party challenging; 
but no person shall be disqualified as a juror 
by reason of having formed or expressed an 
opinion upon the matter or cause to be 
submitted to such jury, founded upon public 
rumor, statements in public journals or common 
notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the 
court that the juror can and will, 
notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially 
and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to 
him. 
